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Clashes Between Czechoslovak Civilians and Soviet Troops, 21 August



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[USSR-Czechoslovakia: (Information of 2300 EDT)]

Soviet forces and their Warsaw Pact allies have gained control of most of the major Czechoslovak urban centers without encountering any resistance from the Czechoslovak military forces.

The swift and well-coordinated advance by the intervening forces resulted in the seizure of the Czech capital with a suddenness that left the Czech leaders with virtually no alternative but to accept the fait accompli.

There is still no reliable estimate of the number of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which are occupying Czechoslovakia but it has been reported that one Soviet airborne division and one Soviet motorized rifle division as well as other smaller units are in Prague. It is likely that most, if not all, of the units which were moved into position near the Czechoslovak border--as many as 20 divisions--are involved.

In contrast to their determined military intervention, the Soviets seem to be acting cautiously in what may be an effort to minimize the political impact of their action. Moscow may have in mind working with the present Czechoslovak party presidium rather than replacing it completely. Czechoslovak leaders reportedly met the morning of 21 August with unidentified Soviets in Prague, presumably to discuss changes in the party and government leadership. Moscow later in the day categorically rejected rumors circulating in Czechoslovakia that it has any intention to bring back Novotny as the leader. Another meeting reportedly is scheduled for this morning at the Soviet Embassy. Elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, the behavior of the Russian forces has reportedly been generally correct.

Ambassador Beam in Prague has pointed out that the Soviet effort to put as good a face as possible]

On the intervention and the failure to produce "their" regime quickly may create a sticky situation for the USSR.

One of the first Soviet targets on entering Czechoslovakia was apprehension of the most liberal of the Czechoslovak leaders. During the day, at least eight were taken into custody, including party chief Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, party secretary Cisar, and National Assembly chairman Smrkovsky. At the same time, however, the Soviets did not attempt to prevent the leading organs of the regime from convening.

The Soviets also refrained from any immediate concerted effort to close down Czech communications media. Czechoslovak papers reportedly continued to print unmolested yesterday, distributing their editions free. By late last night, however, Czech radio stations were being closed down, and only one, "Radio Free Czechoslovakia," is still on the air.

Despite the fact that Czech military units were not ordered to resist the intervention and the population was ordered to remain calm, there was sporadic and spontaneous civil resistance reported in several areas.

Prague announced yesterday that six citizens had been killed and 47 wounded in a clash with "occupation troops" in northwestern Czechoslovakia. In the eastern part of the country ten persons were reported killed and others wounded, including some Soviet soldiers. In still another clash, two Soviet vehicles were reportedly set afire by Molotov cocktails. There are also reliable reports of scattered fighting in Prague and of Soviet tanks firing point blank into several buildings including Prague Radio.

(continued)


【 The population also reacted with a one-minute nationwide work stoppage, and all buses and streetcars in Prague reportedly ceased their runs by mid-afternoon. Although the Czech regime has held out the prospect of a general strike only as a last resort, a spontaneous national work stoppage may be a more real possibility.

Eastern European participants have echoed the Soviet rationale for the intervention. The first Polish announcement justified the intervention as being in response to a request by the Czechoslovak "party and government leadership." The underlying argument in the Polish statement, however, seems to reflect an unwillingness to accept changes in another Eastern European country which could possibly affect the stability of pro-Soviet regimes. Gomulka may also feel constrained to cooperate with the Soviets in the interests of assuring his own survival in the bitter internal Polish party struggle.

In an address to a joint session of the party and government and mass organizations, Rumanian leader Ceausescu on 21 August expressed full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Communist Party and harshly condemned the USSR's "unjustified" intervention. A statement by Tito was softer in tone, probably a reflection of his concern that unrest might be sparked in Yugoslavia.

Access to West Berlin has thus far been unimpeded. The rapid transit system between the two parts of the city was closed for approximately 45 minutes early on 21 August by the East Germans, allegedly because of a "power failure." East German border patrols along the Wall were doubled. (Map)】

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■ Vietnam: Communist forces shifted the focus of their current offensive to the Mekong Delta on 21 August.

The Communists struck more than 20 South Vietnamese provincial capitals, district towns, and air-fields in the delta early on the morning of the 21st with mortar and/or ground assaults. Allied casualties have been light thus far, but all sources continue to indicate that the coordinated action in IV Corps is just a prelude to heavier fighting.

Elsewhere in South Vietnam, Communist units maintained heavy pressure on allied positions in northern III Corps and conducted light and scattered actions throughout the central and northern provinces. Late press reports indicate that Saigon was shelled for the first time in two months.

It now appears that the attacks of the past few days are only the beginning of a countrywide enemy offensive which may continue for an extended period and will strive for dramatic results. The situation in I Corps is particularly ominous, and there is strong evidence that new attacks are set for the near future in the other corps areas.

* * * *

Hanoi propaganda has strongly defended the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. North Vietnam is the only Communist country not actually involved in the occupation to come to Moscow's immediate propaganda support. In an early morning broadcast on the 21st, Hanoi radio called the move a "noble effort" and a response to a Czech request.

This wholehearted endorsement is in marked contrast to Hanoi's noncommittal public attitude on]

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[Moscow-Prague differences before the Soviet intervention. Prior to the occupation there was only limited propaganda commentary and no gesture of support to either side. North Vietnam may have initially had some sympathy for Czech aspirations for independence, but this apparently has been superseded by Hanoi's concern that the Soviets might lose interest in Vietnam and curtail their massive assistance program.

[Map]

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Mongolia: Mongolia's fourth five-year economic plan is working unsatisfactorily, despite large infusions of Soviet aid.

A Mongolian State Planning Commission report states that although the 1967 goals of Mongolia's fourth plan (1966-70) had been "basically" fulfilled, performances in livestock raising and processing of animal products for export, Mongolia's chief industries, were disappointing. The commission blamed severe weather, which in 1967 killed about 17 percent of Mongolia's estimated 23 million domestic animals. It also criticized the 1967 performance of the animal processing industry for waste, poor quality of export products, and inefficiency.

The report claimed that agriculture in 1967 was able to supply all the needs of Mongolia's 1.2 million people. It added, however, that in the future emphasis will be placed on growing fodder for livestock.

Despite 1.3 billion dollars of Soviet aid for the current five-year plan, only 70 of 170 planned construction projects were completed during 1967. The commission blamed the low quality of Mongolian labor and management. The Chinese had provided much of the skilled labor on construction projects until all aid to Mongolia was withdrawn by China after 1966.

Mongolia's economy can be expected to remain livestock centered for the foreseeable future, with a few modern industrial sites--such as the new city of Darkhan--built largely by Soviet and East European technicians and workers.

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South Korean Naval Forces Seize North Korean Agent Boat



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Korea: South Korean naval forces seized a North Korean agent boat off the southern coast early on 21 August.


This 50- to 75-ton boat was intercepted and disabled as it left Cheju Island, where four infiltrators had been put ashore several hours earlier. The boat sank as the South Koreans were towing it into shore. Eight North Koreans were killed and two captured on the boat. All four of the agents who had landed on Cheju Island were killed.

According to South Korean officials, the North Koreans were trying to rescue a leader of a Communist underground organization. The South Koreans reportedly planned their operation on the basis of information obtained during the roundup of a spy net in southern South Korea late last month.

This is the second confirmed North Korean sea infiltration attempt this year. Two agents who landed on the southwestern coast on 29 July were killed the next day. (Map)

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Status of Provincial Level Governments



Revolutionary Committee*	Date Formed	Chairmanship	Revolutionary Committee*	Date Formed	Chairmanship
Heilungkiang	31 Jan. 1967	Civilian	Kiangsi	5 Jan. 1968	Military
Shanghai	5 Feb.	Civilian	Kansu	24 Jan.	Military
Kweichow	14 Feb.	Military	Honan	27 Jan.	Civilian
Shantung	23 Feb.	Civilian	Hopeh	3 Feb.	Civilian
Shansi	18 Mar.	Civilian	Hupeh	5 Feb.	Military
Peking	20 Apr.	Civilian	Kwangtung	21 Feb.	Military
Tsinghai	12 Aug.	Military	Kirin	6 Mar.	Military
Inner Mongolia	1 Nov.	Military	Kiangsu	23 Mar.	Military
Tientsin	6 Dec.	Civilian	Chekiang	24 Mar.	Military
			Hunan	9 Apr.	Military
			Ningsia	10 Apr.	Military
			Anhwei	18 Apr.	Military
			Shensi	1 May	Civilian
			Liaoning	10 May	Military
			Szechwan	31 May	Military
			Yunnan	13 Aug.	Military
			Fukien	19 Aug.	Military

*A Maoist form of local government created during the Cultural Revolution to replace discredited party and government units.

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Communist China: Peking's efforts to form new governments in the provinces are once again picking up momentum.

Following recent steps to moderate the course of the Cultural Revolution, "revolutionary committees" have been formed in both Yunnan and Fukien provinces within the past week. These are the first provincial governments to be established since 31 May. There now remain only three provinces--Kwangsi, Sinkiang, and Tibet--where new government bodies have yet to be formed. Even in these areas there are signs that the impasse in Peking concerning the local leadership has been broken. Peking media have been underscoring the need to complete this process "as soon as possible."

Like most of the provincial governing bodies formed this year, Yunnan and Fukien are dominated by military officials. In each case, former provincial government officials have been included in the new ruling committees probably in an effort to project an image of joint participation, as well as to take advantage of their expertise. Representatives of local Red Guard and "revolutionary" mass organizations--who are supposed to be a major component of Maoist provincial governments--are, however, conspicuously excluded from the published namelists of top officials.

The renewed drive to set up army-dominated provincial governments is in line with other signs that the army has been given greater authority in recent weeks to suppress Red Guard violence in the provinces. Reports of continued disturbances in many areas of China, however, suggest that the army is not yet acting with uniform vigor. In some areas the military has been split over which faction to support, and such differences may still persist.

[Redacted] (Map)

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Bolivia: President Barrientos has announced the discovery of a coup plot and the arrest of several persons involved in it.

The President said that the coup attempt was headed by the recently dismissed army chief of staff, General Marcos Vasquez, and also involved the Bolivian Socialist Falange, an opposition political party. [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Vasquez' announcement over La Paz radio on 20 August that he was in open revolt against the Barrientos government was apparently intended as a belated signal for his followers to make their move.

This call to revolt by General Vasquez was answered by armed forces commander General Ovando, who stated that dialogue had not produced positive results and that the army now would take an active role in preventing anarchy. This new tough line by Ovando may indicate that the armed forces, which had previously tried to disassociate themselves from the Barrientos administration during this political crisis, are prepared to take a much stronger hand in the government.

The increasing student violence has probably helped prompt the army to take a more active role. On the evening of 20 August, police clashed with students in La Paz, and in the ensuing melee the Bolivian-American Center was extensively damaged.

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South Africa: Student demonstrations, now in their second week, have increased in size and militancy.

The demonstrations began on 14 August as a small, orderly sit-in at the University of Cape Town to protest the government-ordered dismissal of a recently appointed African professor. Protest fever quickly spread to other English-speaking universities, and in Johannesburg students held "solidarity" parades and a public meeting. When the demonstrators began to focus on the issue of government control over universities, faculty members lent their support.

Prime Minister Vorster ordered university authorities to solve their problem and threatened to take charge if they could not. The Johannesburg demonstration was short-lived, and many of the participants were roughly treated by Afrikaner toughs. The Cape Town protesters, who had the forethought to hire protection, still persist, although some division among the students reportedly arose when their leaders focused attention on the whole question of South Africa's rigid racial policy--a step further than most students are willing to go.

Although the protesters represent only a small minority of the students, their willingness to take to the streets is unique in South Africa, where the government can exert considerable influence over their future careers. The demonstrations will increase Vorster's problems with the ultrarightists within his party against whom he has publicly moved in recent weeks. [redacted]

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Guyana: A strike organized by supporters of leftist opposition leader Cheddi Jagan has all but paralyzed Guyana's vital sugar industry. The majority of sugar workers belong to a progovernment union, but delays in promised wage and benefit increases--together with the use of threats and violence by the Jagan forces--have kept them off the job. If the pro-Jagan union can force wage increases now, its prospects for gaining the loyalty of all the workers would be much enhanced. Sugar is a mainstay of Guyana's economy, and control of the sugar workers would greatly strengthen Jagan's political position.

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Macao: A British consul will soon be assigned to the Portuguese colony. The British consular staff withdrew from Macao in May 1967 when violent demonstrations by Chinese militants brought the consulate's activities to a standstill. The new consul, whose appointment has reportedly been accepted by the Macao Government, will reside in Hong Kong, probably to avoid possible harassment by Chinese activists.

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